io.github.nirholas/3d-agent-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  dependency "@x402/evm" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ejs" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@x402/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@x402/svm" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@anthropic-ai/sdk" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@x402/core" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "cors" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@metaplex-foundation/js" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "ws" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@ethereum-attestation-service/eas-sdk" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "aws-sdk" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  .env.example: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) src/tools/pump-snapshot.js: assigns a literal to token (HZ1J…t3 (len 44)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. src/tools/sentiment-pulse.js: assigns a literal to token (HZ1J…t3 (len 44)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/tools/agenc-client.js) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/_shared.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/agenc-client.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/agenc-get-agent.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/agenc-get-task.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/agenc-list-tasks.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/agent-delegate-action.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/agent-reputation.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/aixbt-intel.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/aixbt-projects.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/ens-sns-resolve.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/mesh-forge.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/pose-seed.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/pump-snapshot.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/rig-mesh.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/sentiment-pulse.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/text-to-avatar.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/vanity-grinder.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.nirholas/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure