1 check that ran failed — version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.
- Publisher
- io.github.nonameuserd
- Repository
- github.com/nonameuserd/paybond-kit
- Install
- npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit, npm:@paybond/kit, pypi:paybond-kit
- Versions
- 22
- Inspected
- 4 of 6 checks · 65%
- Scored
- 2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0
What we checked
Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.
Injection surface
unscannable25% of gradeTool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).
No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.
Supply chain
warn25% of gradePackage provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.
package name "@paybond/kit" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "vite" (typosquat candidate)
Credential hygiene
pass15% of gradeHow the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.
Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. templates/paybond-crewai-procurement-agent/crew.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.
Permission scope
pass15% of gradeDeclared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.
Network egress present (templates/paybond-stripe-agent-demo/src/charge-customer.ts: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.
Version behavior
fail10% of gradeDiff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).
vs prior 0.12.10 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.paybond.ai, api.stripe.com, example.com.
Transport config
unscannable10% of gradeRemote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.
local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.
Version history
Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.
| Version | Published | Grade | Score | Inspected | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v0.12.11 · current | 2026-07-19 | B | 77.5 | 4/6 · 65% | ±0 |
| v0.12.10 | 2026-07-18 | B | 87.5 | 3/6 · 55% | — |