io.github.occasiolabs/occasio

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  src/index.js: contains a hardcoded GitHub personal access token (classic) (ghp_…AA (len 40)). src/demo/attest-demo.js: assigns a literal to api_key ((?i)…S+ (len 37)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. src/demo/audit-demo.js: assigns a literal to api_key ((?i)…S+ (len 37)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/baseline.js) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  references credential paths: src/demo/anomalies-demo.js: references a credential path (/.ssh/) has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/demo/audit-demo.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/adapters/claude-code.js: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/demo/audit-demo.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/demo/anomalies-demo.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: 9 files (src/demo/audit-demo.js, src/eyes/dump.js, src/harness.js, +6 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 20 files (src/demo/anomalies-demo.js, src/demo/attest-demo.js, src/demo/audit-demo.js, +17 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.occasiolabs/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (Mixpanel) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure