io.github.oxbshw/watch-skill

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. examples/05-multilingual-arabic/index_arabic.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  references credential paths: src/watch_skill/operate/fixture_site.py: references a credential path (/.ssh/) installer script pipes a download into a shell — conventional, but worth reading before running (scripts/install.sh: pipes a download into a shell). has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (examples/08-loop-types/monitor_loop.py: subprocess.* call; app/src/preview.ts: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (examples/08-loop-types/monitor_loop.py: subprocess.* call; src/watch_skill/config.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 44 files (examples/08-loop-types/monitor_loop.py, examples/08-loop-types/render_title_card.py, examples/09-framework-adapters/_demo_clip.py, +41 more) discloses dynamic code execution: src/watch_skill/vision/worker_main.py: uses eval()/exec() discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 10 files (src/watch_skill/config.py, src/watch_skill/identity.py, src/watch_skill/acquire/cache.py, +7 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.4.1 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: dynamic-eval, fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.deepseek.com, api.fireworks.ai, api.groq.com, api.minimax.io, api.mistral.ai, api.moonshot.ai, api.openai.com, api.together.xyz, api.x.ai, api.z.ai, astral.sh, attacker.example, dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com, evermeet.cx, example.com, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, github.com, huggingface.co, ollama.com, openrouter.ai, raw.githubusercontent.com, user, www.gyan.dev, www.tiktok.com, www.w3.org, www.youtube.com, x.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); manifest/source references Telemetry behavior — disclosure