io.github.ozankasikci/global-agent-memory

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/e2e/test_transports.py: assigns a literal to token (test…en (len 16)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/unit/test_security.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.)

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/global_memory/integrations/manager.py: subprocess.* call; dashboard/src/lib/api.ts: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/global_memory/integrations/manager.py: subprocess.* call; dashboard/vite.config.ts: builds a path containing '..' (traversal-prone)). discloses shell/exec capability: 5 files (src/global_memory/integrations/manager.py, src/global_memory/mcp/daemon_control.py, src/global_memory/operations/native_services.py, +2 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 5 files (dashboard/vite.config.ts, src/global_memory/integrations/manager.py, src/global_memory/mcp/daemon_control.py, +2 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.ozankasikci/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure