2 checks that ran failed — supply chain and permission scope — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.
- Publisher
- io.github.phasespace-labs
- Repository
- github.com/phasespace-labs/palinode
- Install
- pypi:palinode, pypi:palinode, pypi:palinode, pypi:palinode, pypi:palinode, pypi:palinode, pypi:palinode
- Versions
- 7
- Inspected
- 4 of 6 checks · 65%
- Scored
- 2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0
What we checked
Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.
Injection surface
unscannable25% of gradeTool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).
No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.
Supply chain
fail25% of gradePackage provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.
Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script
Credential hygiene
pass15% of gradeHow the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.
Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. palinode/api/memory_write.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.
Permission scope
fail15% of gradeDeclared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.
HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (palinode/api/routers/health.py: subprocess.* call; palinode/cli/_api.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (palinode/api/routers/health.py: subprocess.* call; palinode/api/routers/health.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/api/routers/health.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/api/routers/memory.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/cli/__init__.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/cli/mcp_smoke.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/consolidation/write_time.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/core/git_tools.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/diagnostics/checks/git_remote.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/diagnostics/checks/watcher.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: palinode/ingest/pipeline.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_api_bearer_auth.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_cli_init.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_consolidation_dry_run.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_deploy_systemd.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_migrate_openclaw.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_no_build_artifacts_tracked.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_proposer_seam.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_security_narrowed_exceptions.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_session_end_floor_hook.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_setup_worktree.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_subprocess_argv_form.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_ui_phase1.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: palinode/core/defaults.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: palinode/core/store.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/api/routers/health.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/api/routers/health.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/api/routers/session.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/cli/init.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/cli/mcp_smoke.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/cli/mcp_smoke.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/consolidation/runner.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/consolidation/write_time.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/consolidation/write_time.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/core/git_tools.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/ingest/pipeline.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/migration/mem0_classify.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: palinode/migration/mem0_export.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_archive_recall_485.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_audit.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_embedding_tools.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_executor.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_executor.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_executor_replace_guard.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_fact_ids.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_list_read.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_list_read.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_prompts.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_prompts.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_robustness_483.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_session_end.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_session_end_dedup.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_setup_worktree.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_ttl_archive_482.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_write_time.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.
Version behavior
unscannable10% of gradeDiff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).
no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.phasespace-labs/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.
Transport config
warn10% of gradeRemote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.
manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure
Version history
Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.
| Version | Published | Grade | Score | Inspected | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v0.9.3 · current | 2026-07-18 | D | 55 | 4/6 · 65% | — |