MCP server · trust report

io.github.po4erk91/thread-keeper

2 checks that ran failed — permission scope and transport config — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.po4erk91
Repository
github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper
Install
pypi:threadkeeper, pypi:threadkeeper
Versions
2
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean3 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    warn15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tests/test_dialectic_miner.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. tests/test_tools_smoke.py) — the recommended intake shape.

  • Permission scope

    fail15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    HIGH: threadkeeper/adapters/vscode.py: references a sensitive credential path (/mcp.json) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (tests/test_spawn_wrap.py: subprocess.* call; tests/test_skill_watcher.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_spawn_wrap.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/_spawn_wrap.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/auto_update.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/evolve_applier.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/helpers.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/identity.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/memory_guard.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/menubar_app.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/process_health.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/spawn_budget.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/tools/dialog.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: threadkeeper/tools/spawn.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: threadkeeper/search_proxy.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_skill_watcher.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_skills.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_spawn_wrap.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/_setup.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/adapters/claude_code.py: recursive glob ('**') from a broad root discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/adapters/codex.py: recursive glob ('**') from a broad root discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/assets/macos-agent-status/install.sh: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/auto_update.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/candidate_reviewer.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/evolve_applier.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/identity.py: recursive glob ('**') from a broad root discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/menubar_app.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/menubar_app.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/tools/skills.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: threadkeeper/tools/spawn.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.po4erk91/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    fail10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.13.1 · current2026-06-15 C67.54/6 · 65%