io.github.quantamixsol/graqle

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  graqle/core/secret_patterns.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. graqle/core/secret_patterns.py: assigns a literal to password (actu…et (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. graqle/routing.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: graqle/cli/commands/doctor.py: references a sensitive credential path (.aws/credentials) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: graqle/cli/commands/init.py: references a sensitive credential path (/mcp.json) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (graqle/cli/main.py: subprocess.* call; graqle/backends/api.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (graqle/cli/main.py: subprocess.* call; graqle/calibration/wrapper.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/main.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/grow.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/init.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/mcp_install.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/plugins.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/release_gate.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/selfupdate.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/trustctl.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/compliance/baseline_doc.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/intelligence/verify.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/runtime/fetcher.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/workflow/autonomous_executor.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/workflow/diff_applicator.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/workflow/mcp_agent.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/audit_branches.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/bisect_edge_loss.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: sdk_self_audit.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: graqle/core/graph.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: graqle/runtime/fetcher.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: scripts/debate_evidence.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/calibration/wrapper.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/chat/conversation_index.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/chat/session_compact.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/cli/commands/calibrate.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/cli/commands/init.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/cli/commands/vscode_gate.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/config/exceptions.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/core/file_writer.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/core/graph.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/core/graph.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/governance/config_drift.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/governance/deps_gate.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/intelligence/compile.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/intelligence/verify.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/plugins/graq_apply.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/tools/graph_health.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/validation/output_format.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/workflow/mcp_agent.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/rebuild_npz.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.quantamixsol/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (datadog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure