1 check that ran failed — permission scope — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.
- Publisher
- io.github.raymondchins
- Repository
- github.com/raymondchins/agentmap
- Install
- npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap
- Versions
- 7
- Inspected
- 4 of 6 checks · 65%
- Scored
- 2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0
What we checked
Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.
Injection surface
unscannable25% of gradeTool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).
No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.
Supply chain
pass25% of gradePackage provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.
repository linkage verified
Credential hygiene
pass15% of gradeHow the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.
Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. hooks/agentmap-codex-nudge.mjs) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.
Permission scope
fail15% of gradeDeclared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.
HIGH: agentmap.mjs: references a sensitive credential path (id_rsa) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (agentmap.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; agentmap.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: agentmap.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: agentmap.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.
Version behavior
pass10% of gradeDiff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).
tool surface, capabilities, install scripts, and publisher unchanged vs prior version 0.14.0 (minor bump); no rug-pull drift.
Transport config
unscannable10% of gradeRemote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.
local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.
Version history
Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.
| Version | Published | Grade | Score | Inspected | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v0.15.1 · current | 2026-07-18 | B | 85 | 4/6 · 65% | ±0 |
| v0.14.0 | 2026-07-04 | B | 85 | 3/6 · 55% | — |