MCP server · trust report

io.github.raymondchins/agentmap

1 check that ran failed — permission scope — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.raymondchins
Repository
github.com/raymondchins/agentmap
Install
npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap, npm:@raymondchins/agentmap
Versions
7
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks3 clean1 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. hooks/agentmap-codex-nudge.mjs) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    fail15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    HIGH: agentmap.mjs: references a sensitive credential path (id_rsa) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (agentmap.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; agentmap.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: agentmap.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: agentmap.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    pass10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    tool surface, capabilities, install scripts, and publisher unchanged vs prior version 0.14.0 (minor bump); no rug-pull drift.

  • Transport config

    unscannable10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.15.1 · current2026-07-18 B854/6 · 65%±0
v0.14.02026-07-04 B853/6 · 55%