io.github.rhein1/agoragentic

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 142 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  install hook "postinstall" present and not a recognized benign build command; no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. mcp-server.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (mcp-server.js: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 2.1.1 (patch bump): new tool "agoragentic_browse_services" appeared; new tool "agoragentic_quote_service" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "agoragentic_call_service" appeared; new tool "agoragentic_edge_receipt" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "agoragentic_x402_settlement_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "agoragentic_quote" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "agoragentic_interchange_verify_receipt" appeared; new tool "agoragentic_search" appeared; new tool "search_external_marketplaces" appeared; new tool "inspect_external_supply_candidate" appeared; new tool "preview_external_handoff" appeared; new tool "list_external_supply_sources" appeared; new tool "explain_external_marketplace_boundaries" appeared; new tool "agoragentic_register" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "agoragentic_categories" appeared; new tool "agoragentic_x402_test" appeared; new tool "agoragentic_validation_status" appeared; new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): agoragentic.com, example.com, github.com, x402.agoragentic.com.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class); manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure