io.github.sassyconsultingllc/sassymcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tools/verify_audit_fixes.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. sassymcp/modules/setup_wizard.py: assigns a literal to token (ghp_…re (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. hermes_node.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  references credential paths: sassymcp/modules/linux.py: references a credential path (id_rsa) references credential paths: tools/verify_audit_fixes.py: references a credential path (id_rsa) has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (sassymcp/_phone_status.py: subprocess.* call; hermes_node.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (sassymcp/_phone_status.py: subprocess.* call; sassymcp/_atomic.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 18 files (sassymcp/_phone_status.py, sassymcp/auth.py, sassymcp/server.py, +15 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 9 files (sassymcp/_atomic.py, sassymcp/_audit_io.py, sassymcp/server.py, +6 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.14.1 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, dynamic-eval, fs-write, http-client, net, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 127.0.0.1, api.github.com, api.inceptionlabs.ai, api.lemonsqueezy.com, billing.sassyconsultingllc.com, brew.sh., developer.android.com, github.com, mcp., nmap.org, reactjs.org, sassyconsultingllc.com, www.chiark.greenend.org.uk, www.google.com, www.w3.org.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (google-analytics) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure