io.github.seunghan91/ainote

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 512 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  package name "@ainote/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate); dependency "open" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "boxen" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "env_sync_write" has a secret-shaped input parameter "enrollment_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "env_sync_write" has a secret-shaped input parameter "secret_shares" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "auth_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. lib/core/config-manager.js) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (lib/tools/dev-doc-tools.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; package.json depends on HTTP client "axios"). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (lib/tools/dev-doc-tools.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; lib/tools/internal/claude-scanner.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: lib/tools/dev-doc-tools.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: lib/tools/internal/encryption.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: lib/tools/internal/path-mapper.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 5 files (lib/tools/internal/claude-scanner.js, lib/tools/dev-doc-tools.js, lib/tools/internal/encryption.js, +2 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.seunghan91/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://api.ainote.dev/api/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)