MCP server · trust report

io.github.sonilo-ai/sonilo-mcp

2 checks that ran failed — supply chain and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.sonilo-ai
Repository
github.com/sonilo-ai/sonilo-mcp
Install
pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp, pypi:sonilo-mcp
Versions
20
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 75%
Scored
2026-09-02 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean4 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    fail25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script executes at build time: dynamic exec in build script

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/sonilo_mcp/api.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    warn15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/sonilo_mcp/api.py: subprocess.* call; src/sonilo_mcp/api.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/sonilo_mcp/api.py: subprocess.* call; src/sonilo_mcp/api.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/sonilo_mcp/api.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/sonilo_mcp/api.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    fail10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 0.20.1 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.sonilo.com, cdn.example.com, example.com, github.com, platform.sonilo.com, r2.test, x, x.com.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.20.2 · current2026-08-24 D52.55/6 · 75%B→D in v0.20.2
v0.20.12026-08-21 B754/6 · 65%±0
v0.20.02026-08-21 B754/6 · 65%±0
v0.18.02026-08-17 B754/6 · 65%±0
v0.17.02026-08-17 B753/6 · 55%C→B in v0.17.0
v0.16.02026-08-12 C62.55/6 · 75%±0
v0.15.02026-08-06 C62.55/6 · 75%D→C in v0.15.0
v0.13.12026-08-04 D52.55/6 · 75%C→D in v0.13.1
v0.13.02026-08-01 C62.55/6 · 75%D→C in v0.13.0
v0.12.02026-08-01 D52.55/6 · 75%C→D in v0.12.0
v0.9.02026-07-24 C62.54/6 · 65%±0
v0.8.02026-07-23 C62.55/6 · 75%±0
v0.7.02026-07-19 C62.54/6 · 65%