io.github.soufianetahiri/mception

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: os.system/popen in build script; no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/mception/config.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: downloads and pipes straight to a shell (examples/demo_full/setup.py: pipes a download into a shell). references credential paths: src/mception/rules/text_rules.py: references a credential path (\.ssh/) has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (examples/demo_full/server.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); packaging/build_bundle.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 5 files (examples/demo_full/server.py, examples/demo_full/setup.py, packaging/build_bundle.py, +2 more) discloses dynamic code execution: src/mception/rules/supply_chain.py: uses eval()/exec() discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 4 files (packaging/build_bundle.py, src/mception/server.py, src/mception/engines/dispatch.py, +1 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.soufianetahiri/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (datadoghq) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure