io.github.sunholo-data/parse

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 58 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "editDocument" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "getUploadUrl" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "mcpAccount" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "mcpConvert" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "mcpParse" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/cli.js) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (src/cli.js: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.12.0 (minor bump): tool "mcpFormats" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.parse.sunholo.com, api.unstructured.io, docparse.ailang.sunholo.com, github.com, www.sunholo.com.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)