io.github.swapnanil/vectr

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_proactive_proxy.py: assigns a literal to secret (sk-a…23 (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. agent/hook_cli.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: main.py reads a credential path, executes commands, and makes network calls in the same file — the combination that makes exfiltration possible. references credential paths: main.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (agent/hook_cli.py: subprocess.* call; agent/episode_worker.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (agent/hook_cli.py: subprocess.* call; agent/episode_worker.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: agent/hook_cli.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: agent/working_context_store/_memory_edit.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: main.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 4 files (agent/episode_worker.py, agent/instance_registry.py, agent/working_context_store/_export.py, +1 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.11.0 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: dynamic-eval, fs-write, http-client, net, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.example.com, central, central-host, d, daemon, fake-host, github.com, h, host, old, proxy, swapnanilsaha.com, upstream.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure