io.github.tcconnally/perseus

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_redaction.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. perseus.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: perseus.py reads a credential path, executes commands, and makes network calls in the same file — the combination that makes exfiltration possible. HIGH: executes content derived from a network response (perseus.py: passes a network response into an exec/eval call). references credential paths: perseus.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (perseus.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); perseus.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: perseus.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: perseus.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.tcconnally/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure