io.github.therealtimex/browser-use

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  browser_use/config.py: assigns a literal to api_key (your…re (len 24)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. browser_use/__init__.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (browser_use/utils.py: subprocess.* call; browser_use/utils.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (browser_use/utils.py: subprocess.* call; browser_use/cli.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: browser_use/utils.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: browser_use/browser/video_recorder.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/cli.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/config.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/utils.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/agent/prompts.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/agent/service.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/browser/profile.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/browser/profile.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/browser/profile.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/browser/python_highlights.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/browser/watchdogs/local_browser_watchdog.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/filesystem/file_system.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/filesystem/file_system.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/sync/auth.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/sync/auth.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/telemetry/service.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: browser_use/tokens/service.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.therealtimex/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (posthog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure