io.github.thomasxm/crowdsentinel-mcp-server

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/logging_config.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: src/clients/common/cyber_kill_chain.py: references a sensitive credential path (id_rsa) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/agent/mcp_bridge.py: subprocess.* call; src/agent/auth.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/agent/mcp_bridge.py: subprocess.* call; src/logging_config.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/agent/mcp_bridge.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/clients/common/chainsaw_client.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/clients/common/osquery_client.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/wireshark/core/tshark_executor.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/wireshark/extraction/object_extractor.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: src/agent/mcp_bridge.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/logging_config.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/auth.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/auth.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli/main.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/clients/common/asset_discovery.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/clients/common/esql_capabilities.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/storage/storage_manager.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.5.6 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 10.50.1.99, api.abuseipdb.com, api.anthropic.com, api.openai.com, attack.mitre.org, auth.abuse.ch, auth.openai.com, console.anthropic.com, es.prod.example.com, es.staging.example.com, internetdb.shodan.io, learn.microsoft.com, my-es-server, node1, node2, osquery.io, platform.openai.com, threatfox-api.abuse.ch, www.abuseipdb.com, www.elastic.co, www.virustotal.com.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure