MCP server · trust report

io.github.triumsebas/unlimited-mcp

1 check that ran failed — permission scope — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.triumsebas
Repository
Install
pypi:unlimited-mcp, pypi:unlimited-mcp
Versions
2
Inspected
3 of 6 checks · 55%
Scored
2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks0 clean3 flagged3 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

  • Credential hygiene

    warn15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tests/unit/test_hosts_local.py: assigns a literal to secret (supe…23 (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/unit/test_providers_openai_compat.py: assigns a literal to api_key (my-s…ey (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/unit/test_runner_local.py: assigns a literal to secret (supe…23 (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/unlimited_mcp/paths.py) — the recommended intake shape.

  • Permission scope

    fail15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    HIGH: src/unlimited_mcp/server.py: references a sensitive credential path (id_rsa) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/unlimited_mcp/config/schema.py: references a sensitive credential path (id_rsa) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/unlimited_mcp/hosts/ssh.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/unlimited_mcp/tools/config_tools.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/unit/test_hosts_ssh.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/unlimited_mcp/server.py: subprocess.* call; src/unlimited_mcp/providers/openai_compat.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/unlimited_mcp/server.py: subprocess.* call; src/unlimited_mcp/config/loader.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/server.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/server.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/hosts/local.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/jobs/_ts_worker.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/jobs/runner_local.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/jobs/runner_ts.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/tools/config_tools.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/tools/jobs.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/unlimited_mcp/workspace/git_worktree.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/integration/test_phase_0_dod.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/unit/test_workspace_git_worktree.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/unit/test_workspace_manager.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: tests/unit/test_runner_local.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/config/loader.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/hosts/ssh.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/jobs/_ts_worker.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/jobs/_ts_worker.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/jobs/runner_local.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/jobs/store.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/observability/startup_cleanup.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/tools/config_tools.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/tools/jobs.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/unlimited_mcp/workspace/temp_copy.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.triumsebas/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    unscannable10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.9.4 · current2026-05-23 C653/6 · 55%