MCP server · trust report

io.github.trueoriginlabs/vibatchium

1 check that ran failed — permission scope — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.trueoriginlabs
Repository
github.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium
Install
pypi:vibatchium
Versions
1
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean3 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    warn15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tests/test_skills.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. tests/conftest.py) — the recommended intake shape.

  • Permission scope

    fail15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    HIGH: tests/test_setup_cmd.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.cursor/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: vibatchium/setup_cmd.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.cursor/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (tests/test_daemon_log_persist.py: subprocess.* call; tests/test_integration_daemon.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (tests/test_daemon_log_persist.py: subprocess.* call; tests/test_geo.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_daemon_log_persist.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_daemon_singleton.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_integration_daemon.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave6_warmup.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave7_audit_fixes.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave7_codex_friction.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave7_default_headless.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave7_onboarding.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave7_recycle_and_walled.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave7_research.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave7_stealth_gate.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_wave8_bloat.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: vibatchium/cli.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: vibatchium/cli.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: vibatchium/client.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: vibatchium/login.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: vibatchium/sdk.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: vibatchium/setup_cmd.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: vibatchium/skills/handlers.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: vibatchium/cli.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_geo.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_goals.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_gpu_webgl.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_integration_daemon.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_login.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_plugins.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_wave5_selfheal.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_wave5_sessions.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_wave5_sessions.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_wave6_checkpoint.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_wave6_checkpoint.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_wave6_proxy.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_wave6_warmup.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/cli.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/geo.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/gpu.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/login.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/login.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/mcp_server.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/proxy.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/rest.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/sdk.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/secrets.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/daemon/handlers.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/daemon/handlers.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/daemon/paths.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/daemon/registry.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/daemon/server.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/goals/store.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: vibatchium/skills/handlers.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.trueoriginlabs/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    sends telemetry to third-party SDK (amplitude) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.15.1 · current2026-07-16 C72.54/6 · 65%