io.github.work0r-ai/workorai

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 161 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "candidate.search_jobs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "candidate.get_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "candidate.get_applications" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "candidate.set_saved_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "candidate.get_saved_jobs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "candidate.accept_invitation" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "candidate.decline_invitation" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "candidate.withdraw_application" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "candidate.apply_to_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.list_jobs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.get_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.create_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.update_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.publish_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.close_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.archive_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.delete_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.search_candidates_for_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.search_candidates_by_query" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.get_candidate" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.get_candidate_evidence" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.invite_candidate" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.list_applicants" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.set_review_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.get_applicant_detail" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.get_applicant_transcript" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.list_invitations" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "employer.cancel_invitation" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.work0r-ai/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)