2 checks that ran failed — credential hygiene and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.
- Publisher
- io.github.zscaler
- Repository
- github.com/zscaler/zscaler-mcp-server
- Install
- pypi:zscaler-mcp, oci:docker.io/zscaler/zscaler-mcp-server:latest, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp, pypi:zscaler-mcp
- Versions
- 20
- Inspected
- 5 of 6 checks · 75%
- Scored
- 2026-09-02 · rubric 1.0.0
What we checked
Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.
Injection surface
unscannable25% of gradeTool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).
No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.
Supply chain
pass25% of gradePackage provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.
Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified
Credential hygiene
fail15% of gradeHow the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.
zscaler_mcp/auth.py: contains a hardcoded OpenAI API key (sk-y…re (len 23)). .env.example: contains a hardcoded OpenAI API key (sk-y…re (len 23)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_auth.py: assigns a literal to api_key (sk-t…45 (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_security.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. tests/test_auth.py) — the recommended intake shape.
Permission scope
pass15% of gradeDeclared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.
Network egress present (pyproject declares an HTTP client dependency) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.
Version behavior
fail10% of gradeDiff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).
vs prior 0.15.3 (patch bump): new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 0.0.0.0, 127.0.0.1, accounts.google.com, acme.zslogin.net, acme.zsloginbeta.net, api.zscaler.com, app.example.com, auth.pingone.com, cognito-idp., evil.com, example.com, idp.example.com, login.microsoftonline.com, pillow.readthedocs.io, test-issuer.example.com, www.googleapis.com, your-idp.com, your-mcp-server.example.com.
Transport config
warn10% of gradeRemote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.
sends telemetry to third-party SDK (posthog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references Analytics behavior — disclosure
Version history
Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.
| Version | Published | Grade | Score | Inspected | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v0.15.4 · current | 2026-08-19 | C | 70 | 5/6 · 75% | B→C in v0.15.4 |
| v0.15.3 | 2026-08-14 | B | 100 | 3/6 · 55% | ±0 |
| v0.15.2 | 2026-08-13 | B | 77.5 | 5/6 · 75% | ±0 |
| v0.15.0 | 2026-08-07 | B | 80 | 5/6 · 75% | ±0 |
| v0.14.0 | 2026-07-27 | B | 80 | 4/6 · 65% | ±0 |
| v0.13.4 | 2026-07-23 | B | 80 | 5/6 · 75% | ±0 |
| v0.13.3 | 2026-07-21 | B | 80 | 4/6 · 65% | ±0 |
| v0.13.1 | 2026-07-10 | B | 80 | 4/6 · 65% | — |