io.mcp-hangar/hangar

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script, network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  src/mcp_hangar/server/bootstrap/__init__.py: assigns a literal to token (${AP…N} (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. examples/provider_identity/server.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: scripts/smoke_published_artifact.py reads a credential path, executes commands, and makes network calls in the same file — the combination that makes exfiltration possible. HIGH: downloads and pipes straight to a shell (src/mcp_hangar/server/cli/services/dependency_detector.py: pipes a download into a shell). references credential paths: scripts/smoke_published_artifact.py: references a credential path (/.ssh/) has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (scripts/build_changelog.py: subprocess.* call; scripts/smoke_published_artifact.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 7 files (scripts/build_changelog.py, scripts/smoke_published_artifact.py, src/mcp_hangar/domain/services/image_builder.py, +4 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 5 files (scripts/smoke_published_artifact.py, src/mcp_hangar/infrastructure/launchers/container.py, src/mcp_hangar/server/cli/commands/completion.py, +2 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 2.17.1 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, net, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 10.255.255.1, 127.0.0.1, astral.sh, auth.company.com, claude.ai, cloud.langfuse.com, docker.com, docs.astral.sh, docs.mcp-hangar.io, example.invalid, github.com, mcp-hangar.io, mcp.example.com, mcp.so, nodejs.org, opa, opentelemetry.io, podman.io, pypi.org, registry.modelcontextprotocol.io, x-access-token.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (DataDog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure