io.snyk/mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  install hook "postinstall" contains process-exec primitive; package name "snyk" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@anthropic-ai/sdk" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@sentry/node" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@babel/core" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. wrapper_dist/common.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (wrapper_dist/common.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; wrapper_dist/common.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: wrapper_dist/common.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: test/acceptance/basic.spec.ts: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/common.ts: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: test/util/prepareEnvironment.ts: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: wrapper_dist/common.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: jest.config.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/acceptance/basic.spec.ts: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/acceptance/basic.spec.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/unit/common.spec.ts: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/unit/common.spec.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/common.ts: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.snyk/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (sentry.io) — disclosure, verify opt-in