MCP server · trust report
net.tasklite/mcp
2 checks that ran failed — injection surface and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.
- Publisher
- net.tasklite
- Repository
- github.com/shimon-ks/tasklite-mcp
- Install
- npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp, npm:@tasklite/mcp
- Versions
- 14
- MCP revision
- 2025-11-25 · superseded
- Inspected
- 6 of 6 checks · 100%
- Scored
- 2026-09-09 · rubric 1.0.0
What we checked
Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.
Injection surface
fail25% of gradeTool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).
server instructions: instruction to hide activity from the user. tool "create_automation" param "actions" description: off-vendor URL in a description (api.frankfurter.app); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "deploy_frontend" description: off-vendor URL in a description ({slug}.tasklite.dev); capability text should not name where data goes. server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (tasklite.net); capability text should not name where data goes. server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description ({slug}.tasklite.dev); capability text should not name where data goes.
Supply chain
warn25% of gradePackage provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.
package name "@tasklite/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate)
Credential hygiene
pass15% of gradeHow the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.
No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.
Permission scope
pass15% of gradeDeclared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.
No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.
Version behavior
fail10% of gradeDiff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).
vs prior 0.13.0 (minor bump): new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): github.com, tasklite.net.
Transport config
pass10% of gradeRemote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.
remote endpoint "https://mcp.tasklite.net/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)
Version history
Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.
| Version | Published | Grade | Score | Inspected | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v0.14.1 · current | 2026-09-09 | D | 52.5 | 6/6 · 100% | ±0 |
| v0.13.0 | 2026-09-07 | D | 57.5 | 6/6 · 100% | C→D in v0.13.0 |
| v0.10.0 | 2026-09-06 | C | 62.5 | 6/6 · 100% | D→C in v0.10.0 |
| v0.8.2 | 2026-09-06 | D | 45 | 6/6 · 100% | ±0 |
| v0.5.1 | 2026-08-07 | D | 50 | 4/6 · 75% | — |