MCP server · trust report
nz.phos/marketing-engine
3 checks that ran failed — injection surface, credential hygiene and transport config — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.
- Publisher
- nz.phos
- Repository
- github.com/albermm/piranha-marketing
- Install
- remote only
- Versions
- 1
- MCP revision
- 2025-11-25 · superseded
- Inspected
- 4 of 6 checks · 75%
- Scored
- 2026-09-03 · rubric 1.0.0
What we checked
Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.
Injection surface
fail25% of gradeTool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).
tool "spiritual_chat" description: text addressed to the model rather than describing a capability.
Supply chain
pass25% of gradePackage provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.
repository linkage verified
Credential hygiene
fail15% of gradeHow the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.
tool "truth_lens_analyze" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "truth_post_compose" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "wisdom_lens_generate" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "spiritual_chat" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_conversation_summary" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "examen_reflect" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_weekly_plan" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "semantic_search" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_saints" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_daily_saint" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_daily_readings" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_liturgical_day" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_quotes" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_formation_programs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_pillars" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).
Permission scope
unscannable15% of gradeDeclared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.
No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.
Version behavior
unscannable10% of gradeDiff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).
no prior version to diff (first sight of nz.phos/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.
Transport config
fail10% of gradeRemote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.
remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)
Version history
Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.
| Version | Published | Grade | Score | Inspected | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 · current | 2026-02-19 | D | 50 | 4/6 · 75% | — |