online.clipy/mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  fail25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "list_context_documents" description: instruction to hide activity from the user. tool "get_recording" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "get_transcript" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "get_summary" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "get_browser_diagnostics" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "wait_for_artifacts" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "download_recording" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "get_key_moments" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "get_agent_context" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "get_agent_context" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "record" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (localhost); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "start_recording" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (localhost); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "add_marker" param "assertUrl" description: off-vendor URL in a description (localhost); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "replace_transcript" param "id" description: off-vendor URL in a description (clipy.online); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  package name "@clipy/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.13.0 (patch bump): new tool "search_memory" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "search_recordings" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_recordings" appeared; new tool "get_recording" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_transcript" appeared; new tool "get_summary" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_browser_diagnostics" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "wait_for_artifacts" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "download_recording" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_key_moments" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_agent_context" whose description contains embedded outbound URL; new tool "record" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "start_recording" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "add_marker" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "add_chapter" appeared; new tool "stop_recording" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "replace_transcript" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "abort_recording" appeared; new tool "list_context_documents" whose description contains do-not-tell-the-user phrase; new tool "get_context_document" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "read_context_document" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.