tv.tootie/unraid-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  skills/unraid/scripts/unraid-query.sh: assigns a literal to API_KEY (${UN…-} (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_auth.py: assigns a literal to token (corr…en (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_auth.py: assigns a literal to token (my-s…en (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_setup.py: assigns a literal to api_key (abc1…et (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/http_layer/test_request_construction.py: assigns a literal to API_KEY (test…45 (len 18)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/integration/test_subscriptions.py: assigns a literal to api_key (my-s…ey (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. tests/test_auth.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (tests/test_review_regressions.py: subprocess.* call; tests/test_client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (tests/test_review_regressions.py: subprocess.* call; tests/test_rclone.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_review_regressions.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_auth.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_rclone.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/mcporter/test-destructive.sh: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/mcporter/test-tools.sh: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: unraid_mcp/tools/_disk.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of tv.tootie/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure