MCP server · trust report

video.future/future-video-studio

2 checks that ran failed — credential hygiene and transport config — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
video.future
Repository
github.com/ariadne-coil/fvs-mcp
Install
pypi:future-video-studio-mcp, pypi:future-video-studio-mcp, pypi:future-video-studio-mcp, pypi:future-video-studio-mcp, pypi:future-video-studio-mcp, pypi:future-video-studio-mcp
Versions
7
MCP revision
2025-11-25 · superseded
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 90%
Scored
2026-09-03 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks2 clean3 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    pass25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    Scanned 46 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    fail15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tool "fvs_open_chatgpt_app" has a secret-shaped input parameter "claim_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "fvs_get_paid_render_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "claim_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/fvs_mcp_server/client.py) — the recommended intake shape.

  • Permission scope

    warn15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/fvs_mcp_server/server.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of video.future/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    fail10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.1.8 · current2026-06-11 C67.55/6 · 90%