xyz.signomy/civitae

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 186 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "agent.status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "market.post" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "market.stake" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "market.message" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "govern.vote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "agent.profile" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "forum.thread" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "agent.cashout" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/civitae_mcp/__init__.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (src/civitae_mcp/__init__.py: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.1.2 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): github.com, signomy.xyz.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)