xyz.twzrd.intel/twzrd-agent-intel

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 143 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/twzrd_agent_intel/aop_bind_observe.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: executes content derived from a network response (src/twzrd_agent_intel/mcp/server.py: passes a network response into an exec/eval call). references credential paths: src/twzrd_agent_intel/conformance.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/twzrd_agent_intel/aop_bind_observe.py: subprocess.* call; src/twzrd_agent_intel/toxicity_report.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/twzrd_agent_intel/aop_bind_observe.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/twzrd_agent_intel/toxicity_report.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.0.10 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): ..., 127.0.0.1, agentcommercekit.com, api.agentic.market, api.cdp.coinbase.com, api.helius.xyz, api.leash.market, api.mainnet-beta.solana.com, api.twzrd.xyz, base-mainnet.g.alchemy.com, docs.leash.market, dune.com, eips.ethereum.org, facilitator.payai.network, github.com, host, intel.twzrd.xyz, mainnet.helius-rpc.com, merchant.example, stableenrich.dev, twzrd.xyz, www.agentcommercekit.com, www.w3.org, x402.dexter.cash.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure